Developing a differentially private deep learning algorithm is challenging, due to the difficulty in analyzing the sensitivity of objective functions that are typically used to train deep neural networks. Many existing methods resort to the stochastic gradient descent algorithm and apply a pre-defined sensitivity to the gradients for privatizing weights. However, their slow convergence typically yields a high cumulative privacy loss. Here, we take a different route by employing the method of auxiliary coordinates, which allows us to independently update the weights per layer by optimizing a per-layer objective function. This objective function can be well approximated by a low-order Taylor's expansion, in which sensitivity analysis becomes tractable. We perturb the coefficients of the expansion for privacy, which we optimize using more advanced optimization routines than SGD for faster convergence. We empirically show that our algorithm provides a decent trained model quality under a modest privacy budget.
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Introduction
While providing outstanding performance, it has been shown that trained deep neural networks (DNNs) can expose sensitive information from the dataset they were trained on [2, 14, 13, 5] . In order to protect potentially sensitive training data, many existing methods adopt the notion of privacy, called differential privacy (DP) [4] . Differentially private algorithms often comprise a noise injection step (e.g. during the training process), which is generally detrimental to performance and leads to a trade-off between privacy and utility. The amount of noise necessary for a desired level of privacy depends on the sensitivity of an algorithm, a maximum difference in its output depending on whether or not a single individual participates in the data. In DNNs, the sensitivity of an objective function is often intractable to quantify, since data appears in the function in a nested and complex way. In addition, such models have thousands to millions of parameters, one needs to saveguard, and require many passes over the dataset in training. As a result, providing meaningful privacy guarantees while maintaining reasonable performance remains a challenging task for DNNs.
One existing approach to this problem, DP-SGD [1, 7, 6] , avoids complicated sensitivities, by applying a pre-defined sensitivity to the gradients, which are then perturbed with Gaussian noise before updating the weights to ensure DP. This work also introduces the moments accountant (MA) [1] , a useful method for computing cumulative privacy loss when training for many epochs (a formal introduction to this method is found in Appendix A). In another line of recent work [15, 11, 10] , DP training is achieved by approximating the nested objective function through Taylor approximation and perturbing each of the coefficients of the approximated loss before training.
In this paper, we combine the benefits of these two approaches. We modify the algorithm called the method of auxiliary coordinates (MAC), which allows independent weight updates per layer, by framing the interaction between layers as a local communication problem via introducing auxiliary coordinates [3] . This allows us to split the nested objective function into per-layer objective functions, which can be approximated by low-order Taylor's expansions. In this case the sensitivity analysis of the coefficients becomes tractable.
DP-MAC
The Method of Auxiliary Coordinates
Here we provide a short introduction on the MAC algorithm (see [3] for details). Under a fully connected neural net with K hidden layers, a typical mean squared error (MSE) objective is given by
where f (xn; W) = fK+1(. . . f2(f1(xn; W1) . . .); WK+1). We denote W as a collection of weight matrices of (K + 1)-layers, i.e.,
, where the size of each weight matrix is given by
, and f k could be any type of elementwise activation functions. In the MAC framework [3] , the objective function in eq. 1 is expanded by adding auxiliary variables {zn} (one per datapoint) such that the optimization over many variables are decoupled:
where the partial objective functions at the output layer and at the k-th layer are given by Eo(WK+1, ZK ) =
2N
N n=1 ||yn − fK+1(zK,n; WK+1)|| 2 , and
Alternating optimization of this objective function w.r.t. W and Z minimizes the objective function. In this paper, we set µ = 1, as suggested in [3] . For obtaining differentially private estimates of W, it turns out we need to privatize the W update steps only, while we can keep the Z update steps non-private, as has been studied in Expectation Maximization (EM) type algorithms before [8, 9] .
To make this process DP, we first approximate each objective function as 1st or 2nd-order polynomials in the weights. Then, we perturb each approximate objective function by adding noise to the coefficients and optimize it for estimating W. How much noise we need to add to these coefficients depends on the sensitivity of these coefficients as well as the privacy loss we allow in each training step. The final estimate WT depends on estimates Wt and Zt for all t < T and so we keep the privacy loss per iteration fixed and compute the cumulative loss using the moments accountant.
DP-approximate to the per-layer objective function
First, we consider approximating the per-layer objective function via the 2nd-order Taylor expansion
where
in is the h-th column of the matrix W k , and the derivation of each term
in is given below. Here we choose to use the softplus function as an example activation function for f , but any twice differentiable function is valid. We introduce a new notation Tn(w kh )
We then approximate Tn(w kh ) by the 2nd-order Taylor expansion evaluated atŵ kh . In the first optimization step, we approximate the loss function by the 2nd-order Taylor expansion evaluated at a randomly drawnŵ kh ∼ N (0, I). In the consecutive optimization step, we evaluate the loss function at the noised-up estimateŵ kh obtained from the previous optimization step.
where the derivative expressions of Tn(w kh ) are given by
From this, we define the coefficients a k , b kh , C kh as:
Adding Gaussian noise to these coefficients for privacy modifies the objective function bỹ
) and the amount of additive Gaussian noise depends on the sensitivity (∆a k , ∆b k , ∆C k ) of each term. When using a purely gradient-based optimization routine (e.g. Adam, unlike Conjugate Gradient), we don't have to perturb a k and in the case of first order approximation C k is omitted as well, leaving only b k . This method is not limited to MSE objectives and in the classification task we use a binary cross-entropy objective analogously in the output layer.
Note that on the first W step, unperturbed 1st and 2nd-order approximations provide the same gradient. In this case, if we use vanilla SGD to optimize this first order approximation, this boils down to a variant of DP-SGD, which optimizes each layer objective function separately.
Analytic Sensitivities of the coefficients are given in the appendix. Depending on the architecture of a neural network and dataset at hand, these analytic sensitivity bounds can often be loose, in which case we propose to take a more direct approach and bound the sensitivities directly by clipping the norms of the coefficients
Here, ∂T nk denotes the matrix of ∂T nkh vectors, which are used to compute ∆b k and ∆C k . We found that this yields significantly lower bounds in practice and use these clipping thresholds, along with linear Taylor expansion for all experiments listed below.
Calculation of cumulative privacy loss
Using the moments accountant and the theorem for subsampled Gaussian mechanism given in [1] for composition requires caution, since the log moments of privacy loss are linearly growing, only if we draw fresh noise per new subsampled data. Up to this point our algorithm, unfortunately, draws many noises for many losses given a subsampled data. This is fixed by treating the vectorized coefficients of the perturbed layerwise objectives as a single vector quantity [a1, b1, C1, · · · , aK , bK , CK , ] which is perturbed in one step. As previously done in [6] , we scale down each objective function coefficient by its own sensitivity times the number of partitions √ M K, where m = 3 if a k , b k , C k are used to compute the loss (and m = 1 if only b k is used). This sets the concatenated vector's sensitivity to 1. Then, we add the standard Gaussian noise with standard deviation σ to the vectors and scale up each perturbed quantities by their own sensitivity times √ M K. Partitioning the vector in this way allows us to effectively consider the sensitivity and clipping bounds in each layer independently. Details are given in appendix I. The DP-MAC algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 DP-MAC algorithm
Require: Dataset D, total number of iterations T , privacy parameter σ 2 , sampling rate q
for number of Iterations ≤ T do 1. Optimize eq. 2 for Z 2. Optimize eq. 5 (noised-up objective) for W end for Calculate the total privacy loss (ε, δ) using moments accountant
Experiments
Autoencoder We examine the performance of DP-MAC, when training deeper models, in a reconstruction task with a fully connected autoencoder with 6 layers, as used in the original MAC paper [3] . Unlike the original paper, we don't store any z values but initialized them with a forward pass on each iteration. For this, we use the USPS dataset is a collection of 16x16 pixel grayscale handwritten digits, of which we use 5000 samples for training and 5000 for testing. We provide results for ε values of 1, 2, 4, 8 with δ =1e-5. For comparison, we train the same model with DP-SGD where we use a single norm bound Θg for the full step-wise gradient of the model. In Fig 1, we observe that DP-MAC lacks behind DP-SGD in both private and non-private settings. We suspect that this is in part owed to vanishing gradient updates in the MAC model. We found that independent of the number of Z updates per iteration, gradient updates in the first and last layer of the model differ by up to 4 orders of magnitude. DP-SGD does not exhibit this problem.
Classifier In addition, we show the performance of our method compared to other existing methods on a classification task on the MNIST digit dataset. We train a classifier with a single hidden layer of 300 units using DP-MAC with noise levels σ = [1.0, 2.8, 8 .0], which guarantees DP with δ = 10 −5 and ε = [8, 2, 0.5]. As in [1] , we use a DP-PCA to reduce input dimensionality to 60. Table 2 shows the comparison between our method and the DP-SGD results by [1] as well as the DP convolutional deep belief networks (DP-CDBN) by [10] . Here, our method achieves a comparable test accuracy under the same privacy constraint within a relatively small number of training epochs. Our implementation of both experiments is available at https://github.com/mijungi/dp_mac. 
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Conclusion
We present a novel differentially private deep learning paradigm, DP-MAC, which allows us to compute the sensitivity of the approximate objective functions analytically. Empirically however, we find that directly setting clipping bounds yields significantly lower sensitivities, which leads us to gradient perturbation as a special case. We found that MAC in its current state exhibits vanishing gradient problems in scaling to deeper models, which we believe causes the decrease in test performance compared to regular DP-SGD when training deeper models. Nonetheless, we believe that this work offers an interesting new perspective on the possibilities computing sensitivities in deep neural networks.
Appendix A: Differential Privacy Background
Here we provide background information on the definition of algorithmic privacy and a composition method that we will use in our algorithm, as well as the general formulation of the MAC algorithm.
Differential privacy
Differential privacy (DP) is a formal definition of the privacy properties of data analysis algorithms [5] . Given an algorithm M and neighbouring datasets D, D differing by a single entry. Here, we focus on the inclusionexclusion 2 case, i.e., the dataset D is obtained by excluding one datapoint from the dataset D. The privacy
. The mechanism M is called ε-DP if and only if |L (o) | ≤ ε, ∀o. A weaker version of the above is (ε, δ)-DP, if and only if |L (o) | ≤ ε, with probability at least 1 − δ. What the definition states is that a single individual's participation in the data do not change the output probabilities by much, which limits the amount of information that the algorithm reveals about any one individual.
The most common form of designing differentially private algorithms is by adding noise to a quantity of interest, e.g., a deterministic function h : D → R p computed on sensitive data D. See [5] and [17] for more forms of designing differentially-private algorithms. For privatizing h, one could use the Gaussian mechanism [16] which adds noise to the function, where the noise is calibrated to h's sensitivity, S h , defined by the maximum difference in terms of L2-norm,
Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and covariance S 2 h σ 2 Ip. The perturbed functionh(D) is (ε, δ)-DP, where σ ≥ 2 log(1.25/δ)/ε. In this paper, we use the Gaussian mechanism to achieve differentially private network weights. Next, we describe how the cumulative privacy loss is calculated when we use the Gaussian mechanism repeatedly during training.
The moments accountant
In the moments accountant, a cumulative privacy loss is calculated by bounding the moments of L (o) , where the λ-th moment is defined as the log of the moment generating function evaluated at λ [6] 
. By taking the maximum over the neighbouring datasets, we obtain the worst case λ-th
, where the form of αM(λ) is determined by the mechanism of choice. The moments accountant compute αM(λ) at each step. Due to the composability theorem which states that the λ-th moment composes linearly (See the composability theorem: Theorem 2.1 in [6] when independent noise is added in each step, we can simply sum each upper bound on αM j to obtain an upper bound on the total λ-th moment after T compositions, αM(λ) ≤ T j=1 αM j (λ). Once the moment bound is computed, we can convert the λ-th moment to the (ε, δ)-DP, guarantee by, δ = min λ exp [αM(λ) − λε], for any ε > 0. See Appendix A in [6] for the proof. 
Appendix B: Experiment Results
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Appendix C: Differences from the Previous Version
The previous version of this paper contained an error in the implementation which mistakenly lowered the necessary amount of noise for a given privacy guarantee and, as a result reported wrong test results. In this version we have corrected this error and made a number of additional changes which are listed below:
• Gradient update -Fixed faulty gradient computation, which had reduced effective noise by up to 99% during training. -Improved clipping sensitivity by clipping ∂T rather than the norms of the coefficients b k , C k . -Reduced analytic sensitivity by 50% by excluding
2S
term from coefficients and making better use of inclusion/exclusion DP.
• Experiments -Removed histogram-based layer-wise clipping bound search, which had turned out to be costly in terms of the privacy budget and yield relatively little improvement. Instead all layers now use the same bound. -Classifier experiment now uses DP-PCA to reduce input dimensionality as in [6] . overall results stay roughly the same. -Autoencoder: Worse results than DP-SGD, likely due to vanishing gradient issues.
-Replaced softplus activations with ReLUs.
-Significantly increased batch sizes.
• Notation -Denoted Clipping thresholds as Θ to avoid confusion with T nkh terms.
term due to changes in sensitivity analysis. 
Appendix D: Additional Figures
A B
loss at input layer loss at output layer Figure 4 : The input and output objective functions (black) are well approximated by the 2nd-order approximations (red). In both cases, approximation is made at 0, where the true w at the input layer is −0.7, and 0.7 at the output layer. The blue crosses depict additive noise centered around the approximated loss and the noise variance is determined by the sensitivities of the coefficients and privacy parameter σ 2 . Figure 5 : Learned significant features for labels 0,3,5,6,8 respectively. The non-private features show higher contrast and more characteristics in the high frequencies, whereas the private features become smoothed out and lose contrast.
Algorithm 2 DP-MAC with learning
1. Pre-training using DP-MAC (Algo. 1) 2. DP-histogram release which determines T b k 3. DP-MAC (Algo. 1) training using learned T b k Appendix E: sensitivity of a k
We are using a few assumptions and facts to derive sensitivities below.
• z k,s 2 ≤ Tz for a predefined threshold Tz for all k, s.
• Due to Cauchy-Schwarz inequality: w
• Using a monotonic nonlinearity (e.g., softplus):
which we will further denote as vectors αŵ k , βŵ k .
Without loss of generality, we further assume that (1): the neighbouring datasets are in the form of D = {D , (xS, yS)}.
Now the sensitivity can be divided into three terms due to triangle inequality as
We compute the sensitivity of each of these terms below. The sensitivity of a k 1 is given by
The sensitivity of a k 2 is given by
The sensitivity of a k 3 is given by
The sensitivity of ∆C k is given by
Due to the triangle inequality, of Abadi et al, we need to draw a fresh noise whenever we have a new subsampled data. This means, there
